This opinion piece by Emeritus Professor Amin Saikal, from The University of Western Australia's School of Social Sciences, was originally published in The Conversation on Tuesday 1 September 2026

President Donald Trump has entangled the United States in a war of choice with Iran that he cannot easily win or quit.

The war was meant to be what Trump called “a little excursion” that would be over within a few weeks. But it is now into its seventh month, with no end in sight.

Trump has said he is willing to let the conflict continue for as long as needed to force Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz (which was open to free navigation before the war) and negotiate a deal over its nuclear program (even though experts say Iran was not on the verge of developing a weapon before the war).

The two sides are now in a dangerous limbo, with periodic outbreaks of fighting.

They traded strikes this week, with the US targeting Iran’s Larak island and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) retaliating with attacks on US bases in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.

Meanwhile, there are no real negotiations toward finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Repeated claims of victory

In starting the war in late February, primarily at the instigation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump and his secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth, repeatedly said it would not be long and costly. They were very damning of previous American leaders for miring the US in the long wars.

But Trump acted in a strategic vacuum. His administration underestimated the resilience and preparedness of the Iranian regime to counter the US threat. It also did not foresee Iranian society coalescing in the face of outside aggression.

Even so, Trump repeatedly claimed military triumph, proclaiming Iran’s defensive capabilities had been destroyed and the US had pummelled Iran into accepting a peace deal.

But this was premature. Tehran had not only managed to maintain and rebuild its offensive capability more quickly than expected, it also gained control over the Strait of Hormuz as a critical leverage point to pressure the US and the world.

By May, Tehran had the upper hand and was disinclined to negotiate any deal that did not meet its key demands. These included:

• a ceasefire on all fronts (including Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon)
• the unfreezing of billions of dollars of Iranian assets
• war reparations
• the right to manage the Strait of Hormuz
• a permanent end to any US and Israeli threat to Iran.

These demands were included in the vaguely worded memorandum of understanding Trump signed in June with the Iranian leadership, which was at this point dominated by hardliners from the IRGC. Because the deal was favourable to Tehran, Trump could not endure it for too long.

As pressure mounted from Republican heavyweights and Netanyahu, Trump backed out and launched new attacks. Tehran made no effort to try to save the deal, either – it was in its interest to inflict as much political damage on Trump as possible.

Since then, Trump has reimposed the US blockade on Iranian ports to starve the Islamic regime of oil revenue and launched periodic military strikes to intimidate Tehran. But the stalemate has persisted.

‘Economic D-Day’

With the midterm elections fast approaching, the Trump administration last week announced what it called Operation Economic Outcast, widescale sanctions intended to strangle Iran economically and isolate it globally. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called it “Economic D-Day”.

However, this policy, too, is unlikely to force Iran to capitulate for several reasons.

Both China and Russia have rejected Washington’s move as unacceptable. None of Iran’s neighbouring countries – most notably, Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey – have so far said they would enforce the sanctions.

The only Gulf Arab state that has paused financial transactions and trade with Iran is the United Arab Emirates, given its close coordination with the US and Israel.

As history shows, sanctions have rarely worked as a pressure instrument. Perhaps the only time they proved effective was when they were applied uniformly against the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Iran’s Islamic regime has circumvented US-led sanctions for most of the 47 years it has been in power. It’s done this through sheer self-sufficiency and by diversifying its trade partners. The Iranian public has certainly borne the brunt of the sanctions, but the regime has survived them.

The same result is likely now – the Trump administration’s new sanctions will cause immense hardship for the Iranian economy and people. But the regime will likely be able to protect itself.

The path to resolution

The two sides cannot let the stand-off escalate again and erupt in renewed fighting. Nor can the Strait of Hormuz remain closed, due to the huge costs to the regional and global economies.

Tehran and Washington need to go back to the June memorandum of understanding and enter into direct negotiations to secure a final settlement.

The Pakistani and Qatari mediators are still engaged in bringing the two sides together. And there’s a desire on the part of the Gulf states to see the conflict end. These states are already looking to the future, coming to terms with Iran as a strong regional actor and relying less on the US as their main security provider.

No wonder Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest among them, recently forged a mutual defence pact with Turkey (one of the strongest militaries in NATO and the Middle East) and Pakistan (the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world).

Several other regional states – Egypt, in particular – have considered the possibility of joining the pact, and Iran has welcomed it, too.

While the future still looks very dicey, the only path to end the US-Iran war is diplomacy. It is a tall order, but it is possible.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.